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THE WORLD BANK NEAR THE TURN OF THE CENTURY 
Abstract 
This paper attempts to assess the World Bank's record of 
·performance as.principal lender, generator.of ideas and purveyor. 
of advice. It also· examines its internal structure,. its method z• 
of operation and its relations with the other actors on the. 
development stage. Given the recently increased flows of private 
capital to the middle income countries, on the one hand, and the 
increased need for IDA money, on the other, we see a need for a 
·redefinition of the Bank's central role. Moreover, we find the 
dominance of country and global lending targets, along with the 
absence of meaningful decentralization and capillary action 
between the conceptual and operating wings of the institution to 
be the main obstacles to better performance. 
On the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of Bretton Woods 
we then turn to offering some suggestions for the future. These 
include a more open and participatory approach with respect to 
non-Bank ideas, non-Bank lenders and the borrowing countries. We 
also suggest that the internal personnel promotion culture of the 
Bank constitutes an important dimension of the problem to be 
overcome. 
Key Words: World Bank Experience, Foreign Capital Flows, 
Lending Practices, Development Research 
THE WORLD BANK NEAR THE TURN OF THE CENTURY1 
Gustav Ranis 
Yale University 
The fiftieth anniversary of any institution, including.those 
· ·created ·at Bretton Woods, should serve as an occasion not-so1nuch 
to celebrate past accomplishments as to assess the need for 
changes required in the light of altered circumstances. 
Unfortunately, the World Bank's own just-released effort whose 
title promises just that2 , misses the opportunity and is largely 
a justification of what has been done, i.e., basically a public 
relations document. While it states (p. 17) that "the Bank Group 
has made its share of mistakes," one searches in vain for either 
an enumeration or elucidation of these mistakes nor is there any 
discussion of just how the Bank intends to behave differently in 
the future. 
The Bank is clearly sensitive to its image and has recently 
changed the head of its External Relations Division, presumably 
because it felt the need for repair on that front. It responded 
to the recent Wapenhans Report by promising to pay more attention 
to project implementation relative to project commitment. But 
bigger game than public relations and cutting the embarrassing 
lag between commitments and disbursements is at stake. The Bank, 
1This paper draws on the earlier piece by the author, 
prepared for the Bretton Woods Commission and appearing as one of 
its background papers, "Defining the Mission of the World Bank 
Group" in Bretton Woods: Looking to the Future, July, 1994. 
Comments by Frances Stewart are gratefully acknowledged. 
2The World Bank Group, "Learning from the Past, Embracing · 
.the Future," Washington, D.C., July, 1994. 
like most institutions, seems to have difficulty taking a hard 
look at itself in the mirror. 
Fortunately, we also have the recent report of the Bretton 
Woods Commission, chaired by Paul Volcker3 , which has a more 
·explicit and 'pronouncedly "'forward-looking cast ,and ·indeed · 
advances a number of proposals for the reform of the Bretton 
Woods institutions. However, the recommendations which emerge 
relevant to the World Bank seem rather tame and broad, i.e., in 
the main, to encourage domestic private sector activity while 
avoiding duplication with private foreign capital flows and to 
improve internal efficiency in a number of ways. 4 
This paper presents, in Section I, my own interpretation of 
what I consider to be the critical aspects of the Bank's past 
modus operandi, both external and internal. In Section II I put 
forward some modest suggestions for desirable reforms as we 
approach the turn of the century. 
I. An Assessment of World Bank Performance. 
The Bank's role as a non-private lender, as a research and 
idea-generating unit, and as a provider of advice to the Third 
World, can only be called dominant. Although there are many 
complaints that its net capital outflow is currently quite 
limited, the World Bank family's gross lending to the Third 
3Bretton Woods: Looking to the Future, op. cit .. 
4to be fair, the accompanying Commission Staff Review goes
into a more detailed discussion of some sensitive areas, but 
these are not necessarily reflected in the Commission's report.
Indeed the relationship between the two is, perhaps purposefully, 
left ambiguous. 
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World, at nearly $20 billion a year, continues to make it the 
major non-private contributor, and certainly the major 
multilateral lender. It attracts a substantial and growing 
volume of joint financing from official donors, predominantly the 
'Japanese, as well as'a ,small volume of' joint financing f,rom 
commercial banks. Its private sector arm, the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC), is focused heavily on providing, and 
encouraging others to provide, equity capital to the more 
advanced NICs or near-NICs of the Third World, but, while growing 
fast, is still not a major player. IDA, at the other end of the 
spectrum, while its net lending is rising, is finding its gross 
lending volume squeezed by the ever increasing difficulty of 
pushing large replenishments through DC governments. Partly for 
this reason, partly because both China's and India's economic 
performance has been improving of late, IDA's attention is being 
concentrated increasingly on Sub-Saharan Africa and a few other 
poor countries. Yet, as bilateral concessional aid programs have 
come under the same budgetary pressures, the World Bank family's 
relative role as a gross concessional lender has been 
substantially enhanced, even as the total real value of these 
flows in net transfer terms has been declining and as gross 
commercial flows have taken on vastly increased importance. (See 
Table I) 
The Bank family's major influence on the lending side may 
indeed reside in its role as a rating agency for others, both by 
virtue of its data collection and country analysis efforts and,, 
more importantly, by way of its example as a lender. In this .-~-
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Table I 
World Bank Lending 
(billions of$) 
1970 1980 1990 
Gross disbursements 
IBRD 0.7 4.5 12.2 
IDA 0.2 1.6 3.8 
Total WB 0.9 6.1 16.0 
All flows (private and public) 13.1 104.1 99.0 
WB as% of total 6.9 5.9 16.2 
Net flows 
IBRD 0.4 3.5 2.9 
IDA 0.2 1.6 3.6 
Total WB 0.6 5.1 6.5 
All flows 7.0 61.1 27.8 
WB as %-of total 8.6 8.3 23.4 
Net transfers 
IBRD 0.2 1.7 -4.0 
IDA 0.2 1.5 3.3 
Total WB 0.4 3.2 -0.7 
All flows 4.6 29.5 -26.9 
WB as .9,,0 of total 8.7 10.8 
Sources: World Debt Tables, World Bank Annual Reports 
sense it has, to a considerable extent, supplanted the IMF's 
traditional "house-keeping seal of approval" function. Not only 
are private portfolio and direct investment flows powerfully 
influenced by what the "grey books" have to say about country x, 
but the bilateral donors and regional development banks look to 
the World Bank for their own point of departure. While other 
lenders, public and private, may carp, resent, at times criticize 
and occasionally even deviate from Bank positions on country risk 
assessment, or project viability, the Bank's views are hardly 
ever ignored. 
Such increasing dominance by the Bank over the last several 
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decades can be attributed to its financial muscle relative to 
other ODA providers, as well as to its growing influence in the 
realm of ideas, where it has continually asserted its leadership. 
There is no piece of data assembly or subject for analysis in 
· development in which the Bank has not 'become ·heavily involved~ • 
As development emphases have changed over the years -- some have 
called them fads -- the Bank has consistently been deeply 
engaged. No input into new thinking, from the painstaking 
collection of panel data on households to the application of the 
new growth theory, has been left untouched. The Bank has shown a 
tendency not to innovate but to quickly take over the leadership 
on any given theme, e.g. cost/benefit analysis from the OECD, 
income distribution from Sussex, basic needs from the ILO, and 
the social consequences of adjustment from UNICEF. More current 
examples include the environment, women in development, military 
expenditures and governance. Subjects accepted as topical from 
either a functional or political point of view are quickly 
incorporated into Bank language, the required standard country 
data base, become part of the Bank's research and analysis 
agenda, and sometimes even of its stated lending criteria. 
Needless to add, such continuous modifications of priority 
concerns, whatever their individual merits, not only cause 
consternation and cynicism among borrowers but also add to the 
Bank's administrative costs and to the spreads charged. It is, 
moreover, realistic to assume that it takes the imprimatur of the 
Bank before any new emphasis is generally taken seriously -- for 
better or worse. It is, in sum, a fact of life that the Bank, 
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disposing over an extremely capable professional staff, and a 
..self-assured, if not arrogant, top management -- especially given 
the relative weakness, financially and in human resources terms, 
of its potential competitors -- can.be said clearly to occupy-the 
·conductor's role within the development support ·orchestra-. -
In its most purely intellectual arena of activity, i.e., 
that of development research, the Bank has, for example, been in 
a very expansionary mode until recently, spending roughly $20 
million annually on the subject, mostly in-house. It has its own 
quasi-academic publications, the World Bank Economic Review and 
the World Bank Research Observer, as well as its influential 
annual World Development Reports, plus its quarterly Finance and 
Development (joint with the IMF) -- quite a formidable array. It 
also puts out an impressive, steady stream of working and 
discussion papers emanating from its various divisions on 
virtually every relevant subject. Its dissemination efforts, 
especially in the third world, are prodigious and overwhelming. 
At the same time the Bank has paid relatively little 
attention to the output of other national and international 
organizations engaged in similar activities, but with less human 
and financial resources, including the bilateral aid agencies, 
the regional development banks, and the U.N. family. Indeed even 
much relevant output by academia is largely ignored. While there 
is much cross-referencing and footnoting in most of the Bank's 
output, one finds relatively little to work done outside the 
Bank. The wider academic community is, of course, brought in as 
consultants, as visitors, and as participants in World Bank 
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seminars, etc., but, in general, inadequate attention is paid to 
the intellectual world outside, especially within the developing 
countries themselves where there has been a remarkable 
development of ·capacity over the past few decades. 
one consequence of this situation, the concentration of an·. 
unusually large number of highly qualified professionals within 
one institution, all anxious to show their wares to superiors 
within a hierarchy dominated by an accepted set of views, is thus 
an excessive and costly insularity. In a somewhat closed system 
there is little dissent, little controversy. Especially the non­
Anglo-Saxon academic and policy-making communities, in which 
challenges to the neo-classical free market paradigm, while on 
the wane, still persist, are generally dismissed or taken too 
lightly. For example, it recently took considerable pressure by 
Japan to get the Bank to reexamine its views on the role of 
government in East Asia's famous development success cases. 
As a direct consequence of its position of predominance in 
gross public lending, as well as in applied research and the 
generation and diffusion of new developmental emphases and ideas, 
the Bank's function as an adviser to governments on development 
policy has also expanded dramatically. The so-called "Washington 
Consensus," the conventional wisdom endorsed by the Bank and the 
Fund, is undoubtedly less monolithic and more subtle and 
differentiated today than many critics have asserted. The recent 
official shift from a pure market orientation to the acceptance 
of "market friendly" government interventions, plus the 
acknowledgement that governments may do well by organizing 
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contests and rewarding (or punishing) performance is a case in 
point. But the kernel of truth remains: the Bank is inhabited by 
a large number of highly talented professionals, largely 
economists, who have shown little willingness to dissent or 
deviate from what the in-house conventional wisdom is 'Seen to be··· 
at-any point in time, and analyses of government failure continue 
to have a much easier time than analyses of market failure. 
All this adds up to a position of apparently self-confident 
leadership in lending, as well as in data collection, research, 
and policy advice. An important by-product of the Bank's rather 
dismissive attitude towards other institutions is that inadequate 
consideration has been given to exploring potential divisions of 
labor in various directions, as originally envisioned for the 
Bretton Woods institutions. For example, as a result of the need 
for fast disbursing balance of payments support during the debt 
and adjustment period of the '80s, the Bank has moved deeply into 
IMF territory. While the Bank used to concentrate on projects, 
leaving short-term balance of payments issues and related macro 
advice to the IMF, most SAL's and SECAL's of the debt crisis 
years were really thinly disguised first cousins of IMF 
facilities, i.e. the common objective was to get the money out 
quickly. At the same time, the Fund has increasingly encompassed 
some micro-level policy reforms in its list of concerns; indeed 
Mr. Camdessus5 recently included "participatory government" as 
one of its concerns, a far cry from Bretton Woods. Increasingly 
the need for fast disbursing loans accompanied by a largely 
5Interview, IMF Survey, July 25, 1994. 
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overlapping array of conditionality on macro-economic 
stabilization and micro-economic structural adjustment issues has 
at times rendered the two institutions rather indistinguishable. 
Concerning the Bank's relations with the U.N. family, to 
cite another example, the complementarities envisaged early··on 
with UN-ECOSOC and the Specialized Agencies have persistent~y 
atrophied throughout the post-war period. In the realm of ideas, 
UNICEF's pioneering efforts in preventive health, and UNDP's in 
calling attention to human development as a basic objective as 
well as a means to development, have not been properly 
acknowledged. In the realm of actions, legitimate criticism is 
continuously levelled against the heavily politicized, often 
inefficient and conference-ridden processes of the U.N., but, 
less legitimately, little effort is expended in suggesting the 
paths to a more productive relationship. Also in the realm of 
actions, the World Bank now finances more technical assistance 
than the UNDP, although this also was not what was envisioned at 
Bretton Woods. -The regional development banks, though late­
comers to the family, have similarly been generally treated as 
poor cousins who might be invited as money bags into World Bank­
orchestrated joint financing ventures but would otherwise be 
expected not to "get in the way." While the Bank does more non­
project lending (up to 27% of the total), is undoubtedly more 
professionalized, and more willing. and able ,to perform .country...... 
analyses and provide advice, its project lending portfolio is 
difficult to distinguish from that of the regional banks. Such 
disinclination by the lender. to put much effort, ,.beyond the 
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rhetorical, into the evolution of a sensible division of labor 
among the international financial institutions at a minimum has, 
of course, not been costless. It has led to a substantial 
duplication of effort and functions, permitted borrowers to play 
lenders·off against each other, and;-helped undermine public 
confidence and support for the overall enterprise of aided 
development. 
As to country coverage, the same phenomenon of an essential 
lack of World Bank self-restraint obtains. Even in the smaller, 
poorer countries of each region the Bank is active, along with 
the regional banks. Once the ex-socialist countries of Eastern 
Europe, which had initially refused to join the Bank, were ready 
to become active borrowers, the Bank made every effort to expand 
its activities in that direction, instead of making room for the 
newly created European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
which could have (sensibly, I believe) received a broader than 
strictly private sector mandate. In its dealings with other 
lenders the Bank.. generally prefers to privately criticize their 
admittedly inferior professional capacity and to proceed to 
ignore them. It seems to act on the assumption that, if there is 
a vacuum, by subject or by country, it is best equipped to fill 
it. If a new problem arises, for example in the realm of 
governance, environment or political economy, the ideal solution 
is to hire additional, if more specialized, staff. The 
alternative of staying out of a given area and instead helping to 
build up the relevant capacities of others within a negotiated 
division of labor is apparently viewed as too thankless and time-
10 
consuming; at any rate it does not seem to get serious attention. 
Turning to relevant elements of the Bank's internal modus 
operandi, the most significant characteristic that strikes one is 
its highly centralized structure. Only in a very few borrower 
countries does the Bank have full-fledged resident missions, -and," 
even in such cases, the substantive decision-making locus for new 
commitments and policy advice is located principally in 
Washington. The Volcker Commission found that the typical World 
Bank staff member spends only 7% of her time on recipient country 
contacts. The Bank generally operates through many, relatively 
brief, visiting missions, some focused on the macro picture, 
others on specific sectors, still others on preparing project 
appraisals. Given their brief in-country presence, each mission 
usually gathers information on the run and subsequently prepares 
country, sectoral or project reports back in Washington, sending 
copies sequentially (with changing colors as they approach their 
final stage) for comment to host country officials. While in 
country, missions typically insist on meeting with government 
officials at the highest levels, frequently raising overlapping 
issues and questions. Under such circumstances, not only is it 
difficult to be sure about the·quality of the data and the 
analysis but virtually impossible to guarantee full local 
understanding, jointness and agreement in the determination of 
resource requirements and conditions precedent. The Bank itself, 
given substantial turnover in the composition of its mission 
personnel, is not always in a position to move beyond a 
relatively narrow, technical assessment of a·country's macro,and· 
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especially its micro situation. Its advice consequently often 
lacks realism and depth with respect to the institutional and 
political economy dimension of the task ahead. 
While the Bank preaches decentralization in the context of 
"governance," it clearly does not practice,it. Its own 
organizational choice has succeeded in avoiding the problem of 
11"localitis, but at a high cost in terms of a lack of continuity, 
the need to resort more than is ideal to missions staffed by 
relatively junior professionals and an inherent inability to be 
sufficiently sensitive to differing institutional, political and 
even economic characteristics within individual borrowing 
countries. This undoubtedly has contributed to the accusation, 
admittedly sometimes exaggerated, that World Bank officials 
prepare "boiler plate" conditionality lists on which only the 
country's name and the permissible deficit/GNP ratio, etc. need 
be filled in. 
A second critical feature of the Bank's posture, which has 
helped make it possible to continue to work in this highly 
centralized fashion over the last four decades, is that, as an 
institution, the Bank has rather consistently focused on the 
quantity rather than the quality of its lending. This will 
undoubtedly be hotly denied, but I believe the die on this matter 
was cast early on, essentially during the presidency of Robert 
McNamara, when annual global and country lending targets were 
established, even though -- unlike the case of parliamentary-
funded bilateral donor agencies there was no external mandate 
to doso. While there has been a continuous evolution of,whatis 
12 
meant by "quality," given the changing set of topics warranting 
priority attention (see above), the quantity of lending has 
consistently overcome all else as an indicator of "success," 
either at the individual country desk or aggregate Bank level-. 
•This comment ·leads. one to the; following,• closely related.;_;.· •· -
observation, namely that one must acknowledge the co-existence of 
two separate circulatory systems in operation within the Bank. 
One, encompassing the President's office, the Bank's research 
wings, and, usually, the chief economist in each of the operating 
regions, is concerned with generating, or at least propagating, 
innovative ideas and analyses, with deciding on the subject and 
enhancing the quality of the annual World Development Reports, 
and with focusing attention on whatever the key policy topic or 
topics may be at the moment, whether income distribution, poverty 
reduction, environmental concerns or some combination thereof. 
The other encompasses the operating departments, where the 
continuous flow of project and program lending approvals is what 
matters, where the frequent arrival of "new direction" ideas is 
met with a jaundiced eye and the well-worn bureaucratic response 
that "we are already doing it," and where it is generally 
recognized that the bottom line chances for recognition and 
promotion are largely tied to being polite but getting on with 
the lending. 
The existence of these two circulatory systems, with 
relatively little real capillary action between them, means that 
the Bank suffers from a severe case of .schizophrenia. When the. 
objectives of quantity and quality come into conflict -- and; 
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MacNamara notwithstanding, they usually do -- the need for 
maintaining the flow of commitments invariably overcomes the 
concern with the quality enhancement of the activity and its 
overall impact on the borrower country's performance. What the 
recent Wapenhans Report found in terms of the priority of project 
commitments over project supervision and implementation is at 
least equally true with respect to the Bank's SALs and SECALs, 
which were apparently not the subject of that inquiry. 
Consequently not only the quality of the more than 25 
percent of Bank lending presumably directly addressed to 
structural change but also the not inconsiderable policy-related 
impact of the Bank's project lending has been given somewhat 
short shrift -- though there have been several internal 
assessments of SAL and SECAL performance by both the evaluation 
and research departments, which were, incidentally, quite candid 
but received little publicity. It seems fair to conclude that, 
as far as the lending operations of the Bank are concerned, while 
there is a good deal of posturing about how changing country 
assessments, new policy packages, and the incorporation of the 
latest intellectual concerns, etc. impact the lending programs, 
t~e actual machinery is not deeply affected. Any intelligent 
bureaucracy is able to package its lending in ways which reflect 
current front office "priorities." Certainly all the juices 
continue to flow in the direction of making the loans and 
"getting on with it." 
An important by-product of the observed dominance of formaL. 
or. informal lending targets is that the Bank undoubtedly pushes«, 
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its loans even when there exist viable alternative public donor 
or even private capital possibilities. Thus, even in the poorest 
developing .country context we frequently see donor competition..,,. 
for projects rather than for capital, i.e., dollars chasing 
· projects' rather than•·'the 0 other· way, around.· •'This phenomenon °·i-s· · 
usually explained away by reference to developing country 
absorptive capacity and project preparation bottlenecks. But one 
can observe the Bank pushing to take the initiative and competing 
with other donors for the privilege to lend even in the realm of 
the relatively fast disbursing structural adjustment and program 
loans. At the official level, of course, all lending is 
recipient country request-based and then jointly negotiated. 
But, in fact, the Bank, like other donors, customarily takes the 
initiative, convinces the borrower of what it should ask for and, 
simultaneously, of what it must do, in the way of policy change 
or other, project-related commitments, to merit the loan. As a 
consequence, at the very time that various multilateral and 
bilateral donors are competing with each other to fund projects 
and programs, both, but especially the latter, are consistently 
loaded down with a long list of conditions, partly to impress 
superiors within the Bank, partly to keep up with the IMF -­
whose relatively fewer, more stabilization-oriented conditions 
are usually repeated--, and partly to ensure that most of the 
other elements of the Washington Consensus are duly reflected. 
The fact that the desire to lend is thus overwhelmingly 
strong, while the list of conditions attached is often too long 
and insufficiently differentiated to reflect.specific local 
15 
institutional, political, and even economic realities, is well 
recognized by the borrowers. Indeed it is no exaggeration to say 
that both parties, having gone through this particular procedure 
many times in the past -- with or without benefit of a 
··Consultative Group -- 'already 'know·full well that, while the-··"l'oan 
instrument may be loaded with conditionality, ultimately the need 
to lend will overcome the need to ensure that those conditions 
are indeed met. What results, at the risk of some exaggeration, 
is a rather time-consuming and expensive ritual dance. Few SAL 
tranche releases have ever been canceled -- at most they are 
delayed. Few countries, certainly not large ones, have ever had 
prolonged break-downs in their relations with the Bank. 
As a consequence, the lending cum conditionality process has 
been plagued by mounting cynicism, has become increasingly 
fatigued and is today not very productive in terms of delivering 
on its lofty development objectives. If policies are improving, 
as they have markedly in many countries in recent years, it is 
mainly because the East Asian example has had a powerful impact 
and because the debt crisis has concentrated borrowers' minds. 
The entire process works well only when local polities have 
decided, largely on their own but possibly with the help of 
outside technical assistance, to effect certain policy changes 
and to approach the international community for financial 
support; Chile and Mexico are prominent recent examples. 
All this is, of course, hard to demonstrate conclusively. 
As in any multi-cook process, it is difficult to pinpoint where 
the-initiative actually resides or to.attribute credit or blame;_ 
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but in its program as well as in its project lending, the Bank 
has done relatively little ex post analysis of the process itself 
or of its contribution to it. Nor has it sought the kind of 
frank exchange with borrowers, at arm's length from loan 
negotiations, ·which ntight·· have yield·ed greater realism,·· more· 
passivity, and a more effective collaborative style. 
II. Considerations for Bank Reform Near the Turn of the Century. 
Major unanticipated changes in the international landscape 
have placed new burdens on the Bratton Woods institutions if they 
are to remain effective major players. Just as the resort to 
flexible exchange rates in the early 70's shifted the center of 
gravity for international monetary decision-making from the IMF 
to the G-7 and seemingly forced the former to concentrate more on 
the developing countries, the equally unexpected resumption of 
large-scale private capital flows is forcing a reluctant World 
Bank to reassess its basic mission. The fact is that the Bank is 
being squeezed, on one side, by private capital flows to the 
successful NIC's and near-NIC's, calling for more activity by the 
IFC and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and, 
on the other, by the increased need for IDA-type funds to deal 
with the severe problem of stagnation in the poor countries of 
the "fourth world," especially Sub-Saharan Africa. The Bank 
continues to play an important role in many countries but it also 
needs to engage in some honest introspection. Long-term senior 
Bank executive Ernest Stern, when recently asked (The Economist, 
July 23, 1994) what might follow the 50th .anniversary, .responded. 
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"the 51st anniversary". Such complacency won't do; a new 
landscape requires openness to change. 
In general, where the Bank family continues to be active,, 
still in a majority of the middle income and virtually all the 
low inconie' 'countries, 'it ,would be·'well advised to better·' 
integrate its thinking and lending functions, to exercise more 
self-restraint in its lending and to attempt to be a better "team 
player" with respect to other donors, private investors, as well 
as the borrower countries themselves. The Bank surely recognizes 
that it is but one player among many, even though a very 
important one, but the fact that its own future role as a lender 
is likely to be increasingly dwarfed by private flows has certain 
implications which are not yet fully reflected in Bank policy. 
With the World Bank and IDA, together, accounting for less than 
20% of total gross lending, the family's total effectiveness 
would likely be enhanced if the Bank were willing to behave more 
like a major, if increasingly less dominant, primus inter pares 
and exercise more self-restraint in lending, while playing a more 
narrowly defined catalytic role in the intellectual and 
analytical spheres. 
Such a change in posture would have a number of specific 
applications. First, it would mean a greater willingness to 
share responsibility with the regional development banks on a 
country-by-country basis. Given the admittedly superior 
analytical capacities of the World Bank, it would seem to make 
sense for it to focus more on the macro,analysis and program 
',lending end of the spectrum,and to work out.arrangements so that. 
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the various regional development banks can carve out their own 
niches, especially, but not necessarily exclusively, in the 
project area. 
One illustration of what an imaginative division of labor 
could ·accomplish ·res·ides •in the area of "growth· with poverty · 
reduction," currently the avowed central objective of virtually 
all public lending agencies. It is, I believe, generally agreed 
that country-specific measurements of poverty -- both in terms of 
(largely market-related) disposable income poverty and (largely 
government services-related) social income poverty -- remain 
inadequate; this is even more true with respect to how the 
"bottom line" indicators of welfare, such as life expectancy, 
infant mortality and literacy, are distributed across a 
population. There is an urgent need for more country-specific 
analysis here. Behavioral issues, utilizing such data, and 
focusing on how the links between the nature of the growth path 
and the reduction of poverty are affected by the extent of 
decentralization, the character of the fiscal system, and the 
strength and direction of technology change need to be addressed 
prior to the fashioning of effective action cum lending programs. 
Such work requires a detailed understanding of local institutions 
and human resource availabilities -- a domain in which the 
regional development banks, working with indigenous institutions, 
would seem to have a comparative advantage -- with the World Bank 
contributing the macro analysis of growth cum poverty reduction, 
the assessment of borrowing needs, and the identification of 
requisite internal policy changes •. Yet at present everyone:seems 
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to be "in the act," drawing poverty lines, commissioning parallel 
data collection and analytical efforts, as well as gearing up 
their own technical assistance and lending programs. This goes 
well beyond the limits of a healthy competition in the realm of·"'"'" 
ideas. 
Along the same lines, it should be possible to move towards 
a flexible country and/or sectoral division of labor. It might 
make sense, for example, to delegate to the regional banks the 
responsibility for some small countries and/or some specific 
sectoral activities in which they could accumulate specialized 
competence, without necessarily moving to any iron-clad 
segmentation of functions. The occasional chairing of 
Consultative Groups by the Inter-American and Asian Development 
Banks should be encouraged rather than resisted, and efforts 
should be made to restructure and strengthen the African 
Development Bank rather than wringing one's hands and essentially 
ignoring its existence. 
At a minimum, where both the World Bank and a regional bank 
are active, the latter should be fully brought "into the loop" 
early on, i.e. in terms both of original data collection and 
institutional knowledge, as well as analytical efforts and the 
fashioning of lending programs. Jointness in the effort should 
be viewed increasingly as a two-way street, not a World Bank sub~ 
contract. While borrowers would rightly be concerned about 
anything approaching a monolithic stance by the international 
lending community, enhanced interplay between the World Bank, 
which will undoubtedly continue to be more--centralized, and -the--·-· 
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relevant regional bank could be expected to improve efficiency. 
The regional banks could typically concentrate on projects in 
sectors which require more local orientation and expertise, with 
the World Bank playing the role of macro-analyst and program 
lender,· especially in 'the" la-rge, 1niddle income ·'countries. · 
Encouraging the regional banks to spread their wings, leaving to 
them the main responsibility for overall small country lending as 
well as more specialized large country projects, while retaining 
in the World Bank major responsibility for most middle income 
country macro analysis and lending would seem to make a good deal 
of sense. This is not to suggest any precise, therefore rigid 
and confining, blueprint for an improved division of labor on a 
country or sectoral basis, only to suggest that a more 
cooperative and less dismissive or paternalistic attitude by the 
Bank is warranted. If the Bank's posture were one of 
encouragement, of sharing information and assisting the build-up 
of human capital elsewhere, instead of reinforcing inferiority 
complexes by the sheer weight of its lending and intellectual 
capital, it would permit the Bank to concentrate more on what it 
is really good at. 
In a similar vein the Bank's effectiveness would be enhanced 
if it abandoned its even more patronizing attitude towards the 
U.N. family and instead agreed that it should concentrate on such 
subjects as human rights, democratization, governance, concern 
with military expenditures and the spread of nuclear weapons, 
sensitive political issues which are more appropriately addressed 
by one-country-one-vote institutions, with the World Bank and the 
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regional banks focused more narrowly on the economic core of the 
.· development process. Powerful rich countries understandably try 
to influence the multilateral lending institutions in.the 
direction of their, possibly quite meritorious, bilateral 
'political objectives·•--·- ·or at· l:ea:st 'a-re perceived to··do ··s·o·~·,--,.gueh 
pressure frequently turns out to be counter-productive as it 
gives rise to exaggerated conspiracy theories and tends to 
undermine the credibility of the banks as truly multilateral and 
development-oriented institutions. 
Even with respect to such a "narrower" development canvas, 
the World Bank's credibility in the borrowing countries would be 
enhanced if it resisted the tendency, perhaps fueled by the 
required fresh thematics of each World Development Report, to 
support ever-changing fads-du-jour. Most people who have worked 
in the development field for a time realize that there is no 
"magic bullet," and that, even though learning takes place and 
attention may appropriately wander from time to time, depending 
on intellectual progress as well as political necessity, 
continuous programmatic shifts from growth, to income 
distribution, to poverty, to adjustment, back to poverty, to the 
environment, and so on, have resulted in a large measure of 
corrosive cynicism. 
Now that the worst of the debt crisis is over and some 
disillusionment with SAL's has set in, the World Bank should 
resist the temptation to return to a safer "projects only" 
stance. Its non-project lending should instead be increased but 
shifted from a foreign exchange gap orientation-to one focused on 
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the local, as well as foreign, exchange costs of agreed on 
structural changes whose real and psychological costs could be 
eased by the proposed lending package. While it is never wise to 
be doctrinaire about the precise composition of any individual 
country program, program lending,· in some form, ·should·be 
retained as a flexible tool which is still very much needed to 
facilitate major structural reform in many borrower countries. 
Policy-based non-project lending, accompanied by properly 
negotiated and fully "owned" self-conditionality6 , remains the 
best device to help interested borrowers achieve graduation into 
NIC status and beyond. Such a shift would, incidentally, also 
free the IMF to attempt to reclaim its original arena of function 
and expertise -- though the Fund should retain sqme of its new 
and expanded old facilities plus the enhanced flexibility which 
permit it to make longer term commitments. 
As suggested above, some of the smaller country assessment 
and lending activities could be carried out more effectively by 
the regional.development banks, while the World Bank would be 
well advised to decentralize further and establish resident 
missions in at least the larger middle income countries. 
Decentralization is needed, especially for work in such areas as 
poverty reduction, the environment, human development and 
governance, all of which requires an understanding of particular 
features of the domestic landscape, for example with respect to 
6Gerry Helleiner has made this point forcefully on several 
occasions (see, for.example, his "Growth-Oriented Adjustment
Lending: A Critical Appraisal of IMF/World Bank Approaches"
· • paper for South Commission, -Department.·. of. ·Economics, University-,,,~ 
of Toronto, 1988). 
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financial markets, the character of the informal sector, of local 
governments, regulatory norms and the extent to which workably 
competitive forces are at work in the formal industrial sector. 
If, as appears likely, growth with poverty reduction requires not 
only enhancing the employment''•intens'ity' ~of output,but also···· 
improving the allocation of social income flows provided largely 
by government, more attention will need to be paid to governance, 
public sector decentralization and market failure. All these 
considerations are very sensitive to local institutional 
differences and strongly suggest the need for a more 
decentralized structure as well as a more diversified staff on 
the part of the Bank. In order to be effective in the provision 
of relevant technical assistance, an important ingredient in Sub­
Saharan Africa, for instance, it is almost obligatory to develop 
more of a local presence. 
One of the critical, yet sometimes neglected, roles of the 
World Bank family must be to facilitate a fuller integration of 
middle income borrowing countries into the international economy 
so that early graduation becomes more likely. This requires 
larger efforts to mobilize foreign private capital flows than can 
be handled by the IFC. Given its own charter limitations on 
lending directly to the private sector, the Bank needs to 
increase its joint financing activities substantially, as well as 
to explore new opportunities for institution building in the 
financial sector which can be of substantial help to domestic 
medium and small scale enterprises. 
The fact that the average Bank loan remains at the $100 
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million level provides additional evidence as to the persistence 
of a trade-off between the quantity and quality of lending and as 
to how the conflict is currently being resolved. At the same 
time more energy should be expended on IDA replenishments and IDA 
customers than appears currently to be the case.· As the Bank · is , 
increasingly squeezed by private foreign capital flows and 
increased IFC as well as MIGA activity in the middle income 
countries, the IDA and blend countries should get more attention 
as well as resources. This makes especially good sense if the G-
7 can be persuaded to let the IMF pay more attention to its basic 
role as guardian of the international monetary system and less to 
providing financial aid to the poor countries. 
Finally, concerning the inevitably enhanced role of 
international trade, as globalization marches on, the Bank has to 
date paid relatively little attention to the aggregative impact 
of its country-specific advice, frequently suggesting export 
promotion as part of its standard prescription, along with the 
related liberalization of imports, but usually quite irrespective 
of the status of the country's own negotiations reducing trade 
barriers on a reciprocal basis within the GATT. Individual 
country advice on exports must clearly also face up to the global 
so-called "adding-up problem" in particular commodity markets. 
It is increasingly necessary for country programs to be 
sensitized to such global issues, possibly with the help of 
closer working relations with GATT and the hopefully soon to-be­
created World Trade Organization. 
The Bank must, of course, recognize that, .. in the absence of-, 
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joint conceptualization and full agreement with the country 
concerned, at the outset, as to what needs to be done in the way 
of reform, and what additional resources are required to do.it, 
no amount of conditionality will really work. Recognition of 
·this critical/ 'if ,'obvious, point "implies r', however,· ''·something'•yl,es•s0 
obvious, namely the abandonment of, at least implicit, annual 
country and regional or global lending targets. While it is 
institutionally and politically unrealistic to be able to move 
away completely from some sort of routine minimum annual country 
lending activity, major "humps" in levels should be reserved for 
packages negotiated at their own pace and with the initiative 
clearly shifted to the borrower. 
This would require a non-trivial change in the underlying 
modus operandi of the Bank. It would be necessary for the 
institution to become more bank-like, i.e. to assume a posture 
enabling it to sit back, while encouraging would-be borrowers to 
approach it at their initiative with plans for long term reform 
packages. The Bank could, of course, provide technical 
assistance, if requested, to help prepare such packages, although 
more extensive use of local, as opposed to international 
consultants, is also indicated. Major country assessments could 
be carried out with the help of self-destructing, quasi­
independent teams, while drawing upon the substantial expertise 
and experience that has accumulated both within the Bank and in 
the borrowing country, with individuals serving in their own, 
rather than their official capacities. such teams might report 
to the traditional Consultative ·Groups-or to.the Development 
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Committee, preferably in a way which accentuates the uniqueness 
of the new device. But the important ingredient is the 
abandonment of "business-as-usual" lending under which, 
regardless of the annual ritual dance -- with or without 
Consultative 'Group music---, all ,:parties :recogniz·e ·the\' essent0ial,.·ly 
non-substantive, routinized nature of the relationship. The sine 
qua non would have to be the fullest possible agreement and 
commitment by the borrowing country to an agreed policy cum 
resources package over at least a five-year period. With 
packages fashioned in the course of negotiations and adorned with 
key elements of credible "self-conditionality," the Bank would 
then be in a position to be more objective in deciding whether or 
not to continue the flow of resources or to cancel a tranche 
release, or more, in the case of non-compliance. Such a 
procedure would not only acknowledge the growing professional 
competence of LDC policy makers as well as the need for the 
program to be fully accepted and "owned" by the borrower, but it 
would also provide some much needed freshness and credibility to 
a process which has become increasingly fatigued and 
unproductive. The fashioning of realistic programs of reforms to 
be supported over a period long enough for the borrower's 
economic and political risks to be matched by the external 
resource commitments would not, of course, be easy; nor would it 
typically occur more than once in a decade in most cases. But 
what is required is genuine structural change packages along with 
the additional financial resources needed to hold .off vested 
interest groups, ease the pain· of adj.ustment,-as well as provide, 
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the required psychological assurance. 
Such a posture would not, of course, displace on-going 
project lending in a given country but constitute an occasional 
major additional "ballooning" of assistance. It would also be 
consistent with leaving shorter term fiscal and monetary 
stabilization and balance of payment disequilibrium issues to the 
IMF, with the World Bank restricting itself to a, usually 
relatively small, number of key structural policy change measures 
to be carried out over a sufficiently long period of time so that 
institutional and political realities can be taken fully into 
account. 
The bottom line is that any serious effort at enhancing the 
quality of the lending process must entail not only a Bank more 
willing to decentralize and work more closely in partnership with 
the borrower country, but also one that is willing to enhance the 
credibility of the process by occasionally refusing to lend and 
by more than occasionally curtailing its lending in mid-stream. 
The suggested infrequent ballooning of resource flows would take 
place in only a handful of countries at any given time, while 
"business as usual," as previously defined, continues elsewhere. 
It can also be assumed that the anticipated success of such 
an approach would itself lead to a greater willingness by the 
industrial countries to support the Bank's role, in concert with 
others, to bring more developing countries up to NIC status. The 
application of additional catalytic pressure to get, usually 
reluctant, borrowers to accept graduation from NIC to developed. 
-country status at the .successful conclusion of. one or two such.,..;;': 
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major lending cum action packages should also be part of the 
overall negotiating process. This would permit the Bank to turn 
its attention sequentially to other middle-income countries and, 
at the same time, demonstrate to the international community the 
chances for success, one or two countries at a time, in 'the -- ~{;.'.,;;, 
development effort. 
In conclusion, if the Bank is to address the most pressing 
development problems successfully, it needs to be prepared to 
assist both the desperately poor countries, e.g. in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, and the desperately poor citizens in many of the middle 
income countries, e.g. in parts of Latin America. While the 
former will require highly concessional IDA-type flows for some 
time to come, the latter will require the Bank's expertise, more 
than its financial resources, in ensuring that growth will be 
egalitarian as well as sufficiently rapid. And, most 
importantly, as we have been at pains to point out, it will be 
increasingly necessary to shift the focus of initiative, in fact 
as well as on paper, and to be sensitive to economic, 
institutional as well as political differences among borrowing 
countries. 
But the willingness to participate in the formulation of 
such more subtle and differentiated country analysis and action 
programs also requires a change in the internal culture of the 
Bank. If Bank staff are to become more willing to cease lending 
as well as ensure the superior quality of the lending that does 
go forward, the rewards, in terms of internal recognition, 
promotion, etc., must point the way. This clearly has not been_._ 
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the case in the past, which is one of the main reasons why, all 
protestations to the contrary, quantity has crowded out quality, 
as the two internal circulatory systems of the Bank, identified 
earlier, have meshed only intermittently and imperfectly. 
To the outside observer it appears that there are currently~·"' 
two main roads open for rapid World Bank internal promotion: 
outstanding performance within its research/policy formulation 
wing, e.g. in the course of heading up one of the annual WDR's, 
to be rewarded by promotion into one of the senior economist 
positions in a regional or operating department; or, and more 
common, outstanding performance in the quantity of lending and in 
keeping on good terms with senior borrowing country officials. 
In the wake of the projects-focused Wapenhans Report the Bank 
recently promised to reward success in implementation relative to 
the making of new lending commitments. More important and 
also more difficult -- would be providing signals that an effort 
will be made to reward staff who help fashion programs today 
which have a favorable growth cum equity result some years down 
the road. 
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